Three analytically significant features, two extending prior dataset patterns and one new to the dataset. (1) Terminal disable — 'You cannot request another review of this decision' — extends the terminal closure pattern documented in PA-2026-0040 (@Shawinrose), PA-2026-0036 (@carmencuevas01), PA-2026-0024 (@kornbuilds), and PA-2026-0014 (@rovvmut_). The enforcement notice phrasing 'We reviewed your account and found that it still doesn't follow our Community Standards on fraud and deception' confirms that prior reviews occurred; the terminal closure is not the result of a first-pass automated disable but of repeated review and re-enforcement. (2) Two restorations before terminal disable — the reporter states the account was approved twice through appeals and restored, then disabled again terminally. This extends the re-enforcement-after-successful-adjudication pattern from a single-restoration variant (PA-2026-0007: minutes; PA-2026-0018: weeks; PA-2026-0027: hours; PA-2026-0036: days) to a double-restoration variant — the first in the dataset where the detection-adjudication disconnect produced a second favorable review outcome that was subsequently overridden. The detection system overrode not one but two prior adjudication findings before issuing a terminal close. This raises the analytical question of whether repeated appeals actually reduce the probability of restoration or increase it as evidence accumulates — the dataset does not yet have enough cases to answer this. (3) New accounts instantly suspended after terminal disable — the reporter states that new accounts created after the terminal disable are being instantly suspended. This is the first documented instance in the dataset of enforcement extending beyond the originally affected account to newly created identities, implicating device fingerprinting, IP-range enforcement, name/identity matching, or a combination. This is mechanistically distinct from all prior enforcement types in the dataset, which targeted specific existing accounts. Instant new-account suspension suggests the enforcement system is flagging at the device, network, or identity level rather than at the account level — a form of enforcement that bypasses the account-level suspension/appeal architecture entirely. No restoration or appeal path for identity-level flagging is documented in Meta's public policies. See [[finding___post-disable-identity-level-enforcement]]. (4) Policy citation: 'Community Standards on fraud and deception' is more specific than the generic account integrity catch-all cited in the majority of dataset records. It identifies a named policy domain. However, per the reporter's account and the 'still doesn't follow' phrasing in the notice (confirming prior reviews), the policy was applied to an account that had passed two prior reviews — raising the same classification-versus-misclassification question as other specific-policy-cited records in the dataset. More specific citation is not equivalent to accurate citation. Compare to 'Community Standards on cybersecurity' (PA-2026-0004, applied to a link to the reporter's own blog) and 'Terms of Service on who can use Facebook' (PA-2026-0011, PA-2026-0012). See [[finding___enforcement-notice-policy-opacity]] and [[finding___re-enforcement-after-successful-adjudication]].